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1 A great deal of material on this topic can be
obtained on-line at http://www.avoine.net/rfid/.
It is just a matter of time before the first RFID
skimmer will reach our laboratory, and therefore
the designs are as yet unknown. Based on
previous experiences from magnetic stripe card
skimmers, this article considers how RFID
skimmers could exhibit similarities to
traditional ones.
Introduction 
The radio frequency identification (RFID) is a
standardised contactless technology for wireless data
exchange between a device (it can be a reader/writer
device – the interrogator) and a data carrier (tag or
transponder). The technology has its roots in
transponder technology, and was rapidly developed
and adopted by other industries: supply chain
management, retail logistics, animal tagging, human
implants, electronic toll collection, e-passports, car
keys, library book, tracking, tagging and such like. An
RFID device can replace the more or less obsolete
magnetic stripe cards and optical bar codes, but RFID
technology is not only an upgrade. RFID also provides
the user or application with additional properties and
functions: increased data storage space, reading and
writing capability, data integrity protection
(encryption, digital certificates, digital signatures and
more), internal data processing – and last but not at
least – tag interaction without the need for line of
sight or physical contact.
Principle and related work
The interrogator is the tag reader and is also
described as the transceiver. In some cases it also
serves as tag writer. Basically an interrogator consists
of an antenna connected to a transceiver, a signal and
data processing function, internal memory storage
and an interface. The interrogator also has a set of
commands for tag interaction.
The RFID tag is the data carrier, also known as the
transponder. It has several properties which governs
the interaction of distance and data communication
quality: working frequency, antenna design, RF
modulation and power supply. The cheapest and
probably most common in applications, such as
access control and ticketing, are passive tags. These
do not have an internal power supply. This is solved
because the device that interrogates constantly emits
an electromagnetic field induced electric current, and
recharges the integrated capacitor of the tag with
help from the coil within the tag. The capacitor
provides a current to the circuitry, and the tag begins
to send its stored data via modulated backscatter,
simply described as a RF reflection and recognised by
the interrogator.
An RFID tag is identified by its unique identifier
(UID), a number that normally cannot (and should
not) be altered. The UID is often considered to be the
most important information in RFID hacking issues.
There are a several countermeasures to provide for
the protection of data protection, such as encrypting
the data blocks and interrogator authorisation set in
the tag. Several research groups and hacking
communities have reported attacks to get around
such obstacles, for example side-channel attacks, RF
eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle and relay attacks,
cryptographic algorithm attacks, reverse engineering
and emulation of tags.1 What they all seem to have in
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The perspective of the work on RFID tags 
The majority of the RFID research work seems to
concentrate on external attacks. The project described
in this article assumes that the RFID skimming will
actually take place inside the interrogator cabinet.
Several advanced magnetic stripe skimmer devices or
credit card skimmers adapted for point-of-sale (POS)
terminals, petrol pumps and automated teller
machines (ATMs) have been analysed at the Swedish
National Laboratory of Forensic Science – SKL. Based
on observations made during these analyses, it is
predicted that RFID skimmers will be designed in
similar ways.
Similarities with credit card skimmers
A functional skimmer – as recognized by SKL –
acquires two essential types of information: data and
authorisation. These two parts would probably be
common for all kinds of skimmers. For a credit card
skimmer, data would be the F/2F (two-frequency
coherent-phase) data encoded card information
stored on the magnetic stripe, while the PIN (personal
identification number) would correspond to
authorisation.
Briefly explained, the skimming devices that were
analysed that were attached to or embedded inside
magnetic stripe reading devices (here called hosts).
They most often consist of an intercept device
connected to a magnetic head or soldered on to an
internal F/2F decoder unit’s decoded output, with a
power supply from the host or from a separate battery
pack, a microprocessor for data or signal processing,
commonly a flash memory for magnetic stripe data
storage and an interface with the function of
communicating information that is obtained by
skimming, either by wire or wirelessly. The PIN is
often obtained by using a video recording pin-hole
camera, or a keypad tap with wires soldered on to the
printed circuit board (PCB) of the keypad or by using
an extra keypad membrane. Where it is thought that
cabinet intrusion detectors are in place, such
detectors are commonly disabled by short-circuiting
bridges.
Based on the description of a typical credit card
skimmer, the work outlined in this article proposes
that ideas from such devices are applicable to
potential RFID skimmers, internally mounted inside an
interrogator to conceal the electronics. For example,
the wiretapping device would probably be attached to
a RFID transponder decoder unit instead of a F/2F
decoder circuit and so forth.
Discussion
To date, the Swedish National Laboratory of Forensic
Science has not observed any attacks or attempted
attacks on RFID related systems in Sweden. There is
no clear answer for this; the technology behind RFID
is still new or unknown to the law enforcement
authorities in Sweden. The laboratory is currently
running a project to gain advanced knowledge in hi-
tech RFID technology, including standards, hardware
and related work. The project also aims to develop
new forensic analysis methods and best practice
recommendations for potential RFID technology
related crimes.
Conclusion
There are reasons to believe that unmonitored RFID
devices are likely to become targets for embedded
RFID skimmers in the future, located inside
interrogator device cabinets. The level of fraudulent
electronic design has reached a point where
miniaturisation for concealment, advanced signal
processing and wireless communication is no longer
an issue. This is experienced from the large number of
magnetic stripe card (credit card) skimming device
analyses undertaken at SKL. Suggestions on potential
RFID systems to be attacked are access card keys,
transponders, electronic toll collection and asset
tracking. Payment card readers on self service
terminals and petrol pumps are also considered to be
at risk for possible embedded RFID skimmers.
However, tag emulators in plastic card form would
probably be a limiting factor for RFID skimmers. No
such cards that enable the UID to be altered have
been seen on the market yet. It might be less feasible
to expose an electronic tag emulator instead of a
plastic card on RFID terminals monitored by humans
(commercial stores, border controls or on public
transportation systems).
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